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Abstract—Data storage systems and their availability play a crucial
role in contemporary datacenters. Despite using mechanisms such as
automatic fail-over in datacenters, the role of human agents and conse-
quently their destructive errors is inevitable. Due to very large number
of disk drives used in exascale datacenters and their high failure rates,
the disk subsystem in storage systems has become a major source of Data
Unavailability (DU) and Data Loss (DL) initiated by human errors. In
this paper, we investigate the effect of Incorrect Disk Replacement Service
(IDRS) on the availability and reliability of data storage systems. To this
end, we analyze the consequences of IDRS in a disk array, and conduct
Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate DU and DL during mission time.
The proposed modeling framework can cope with a) different storage
array configurations and b) Data Object Survivability (DOS), representing
the effect of system level redundancies such as remote backups and
mirrors. In the proposed framework, the model parameters are obtained
from industrial and scientific reports alongside field data which have
been extracted from a datacenter operating with 70 storage racks. The
results show that ignoring the impact of IDRS leads to unavailability
underestimation by up to three orders of magnitude. Moreover, our
study suggests that by considering the effect of human errors, the
conventional beliefs about the dependability of different Redundant Array
of Independent Disks (RAID) mechanisms should be revised. The results
show that RAID1 can result in lower availability compared to RAID5
in the presence of human errors. The results also show that employing
automatic fail-over policy (using hot spare disks) can reduce the drastic
impacts of human errors by two orders of magnitude.
Index Terms—Data Storage System, Availability, Human Error, Disk
Drive, Monte Carlo Simulation, Markov Model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The availability and reliability of Information systems is seriously
affected by human errors [1], [2], [3], [4] where some field studies
report human errors as the cause of 19% of system failures [5], [3].
Large datacenters with Exa-Byte (EB) storage capacity (by employing
millions of disks drives) are expected to face at least a disk failure per
hour. Mechanisms such as automatic fail-over try to reduce the role
of human agent in service and maintenance tasks, however, in many
cases the involvement of human is inevitable. Meanwhile, despite
precautionary mechanisms such as using checklists and complying
high standards for training the technicians, the human error prob-
ability (hep) is between 0.001 and 0.1 [6], [7], [8], [9]. These
statistics translate into multiple human errors a day in an exascale
datacenter. As a simple and frequent example of human error in data-
centers, assume an array with one failed disk, and a human agent
that is responsible for replacing the failed disk with the brand-new
one. However, due to the lack of concentration, he or she wrongly
removes the operating disk, rather than the failed one. This makes the
whole array unavailable and can even lead to data loss if the wrongly
replaced disk is thrown away [4].
The most vulnerable component in a Data Storage System (DSS)1
is disk drive, where disk failures and Latent Sector Errors2 (LSE) [14]
1Data storage system is responsible to retain digital data with a higher reli-
ability and performance level than individual storage medias, by mechanisms
such as caching [10], [11], [12], data tiering [13], and redundancy.
2Damages to disk sectors, caused by bad head writes, bit errors, and
environmental particles which may be placed between platter and head.
cause the majority of Data Loss (DL) in data-centers. Investigating
the effect of these two incidences on the reliability of disks drives
and disk arrays have been the subject of several studies [15], [16],
[14], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23]. Elerath and Pecht [16],
[17] show that the conventional reliability estimation approach, Mean
Time to Data Loss (MTTDL), can result in DL underestimation by
orders of magnitude, as using MTTDL approach mandates assuming
exponential distribution for both disk failure and fail-over rates, which
is not realistic. In return, this study leverages the field data and shows
that the rate of operational disk failure, LSE, disk fail-over, and Disk
Scrubbing3 can follow a three-parameter Weibull distribution. This
work evaluates the reliability of Redundant Array of Independent
Disks (RAID) using Monte Carlo simulations, but arguably takes the
loss of one data stripe (by LSE) as a Double Disk Failure4 (DDF)
and finally counts the number of DDFs as a reliability metric, which
results in data loss overestimation. Moreover, Elerath and Pecht [16],
[17] just consider the single configuration of array having infinite
cold-spares (mandating human assistance in disk fail-over), while
ignoring the effect of human errors. Greenan et. al. [18] proposes
NOrmalized Magnitude of Data Loss (NOMDL) metric, defined as
the amount of data loss within mission time, normalized to the usable
capacity of disk array, to cope with the limitations of DDF metric.
Elerath and Schindler [15] extend the RAID5 models appeared
in [16], [17], [20] to be applied to RAID6 arrays, by proposing a
closed-form equation that uses a table of failure and repair parameters
obtained by Monte Carlo simulations using Weibull distribution. One
can conclude that the focus of all previous work is on DL in the disk
array, ignoring the possibility of Data Unavailability (DU) caused by
human errors.
Considering the effect of human errors alongside the knowledge
provided by previous models and field studies, we can conclude
that an accurate modeling of RAID dependability is very crucial to
take into account several important criteria including a) a realistic
distribution for failure and repair rates, b) the effect of LSEs and its
differences with operational disk failures, c) the possibility of human
errors in array service and maintenance, and d) evaluation of both
reliability and availability within mission time while considering fair
and meaningful metrics for reliability and availability. To the best
of our knowledge, none of previous studies have addressed these
concerns in a unified framework, while the effect of human errors is
totally missed in the previous dependability models.
In this paper, we propose a dependability model for the disk arrays
by considering the effect of disk failures, LSEs, and Incorrect Disk
Replacement Service (IDRS) as a common sample of human errors5.
To this end, we analyze the possible combinations of operational
3A task that removes LSEs by periodically reading the disk data and
checking it with its parity, correcting the corrupted data using the parity and
moving it to a new location, and mapping out the damaged sectors.
4An event in which the whole data of RAID5 array is lost, due to the
consecutive failure of two disks.
5While the incorrect repair service can have many different roots and
happen in many different conditions, in this work we focus on IDRS.
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2disk failures, LSEs, and IDRS in a disk array. This analysis which
is demonstrated by state diagrams, concludes that the combination
of disk failure and IDRS can result in the unavailability of the
whole array, while the combination of LSE and IRDS results in the
unavailability of one or multiple data stripes, mandating a metric
which is capable to project the magnitude of data unavailability
as well as unavailability duration. We further define NOrmalized
Magnitude of Data Unavailability (NOMDU), as the duration of data
unavailability multiplied to the amount of unavailable data (in an
arbitrary unit such as mega bytes) within mission time, normalized
to the mission time and usable capacity of disk array. In our analysis,
both disk subsystems with and without automatic disk fail-over are
considered.
Using the proposed failure analysis, we conduct Monte Carlo
simulations to evaluate NOMDU and NOMDL during mission time,
by considering three-parameter Weibull distributions for the rate of
operational disk failure, LSE, and IDRS, as well as the corresponding
repair rates. Several important observations are obtained by the pro-
posed model. First, it is shown that human errors can result in storage
unavailability by order of magnitude (up to NOMDU = 10−5 when
human error probability is 0.1). The human error can also increase the
probability of data loss, specially when the human error probability is
more than 0.01 (human error probability of 0.1 can increase data loss
by one order of magnitude). Second, the presence of human errors
can contradict the conventional assumption about the dependability
of RAID mechanisms, as the RAID configurations with greater level
of redundancy suffer higher unavailability caused by human errors.
Third, it is demonstrated that automatic disk fail-over, when on-line
rebuilt is provided by using spare disks, can reduce the drastic impacts
of human errors by orders of magnitude.
The model parameters are obtained from industrial and scientific
reports alongside field data, which are extracted from the main
datacenter of Sharif University of Technology (SUT)6 [24], operating
with 70 storage and computing racks (with more than 100PB storage
capacity). This datacenter is equipped with SAB-SE [25] storage
nodes7 each of which supporting up to 72 disk drives, enabling the
datacenter to support more than 27,000 disk drives.
Our contribution over the recent work [4] is as follows:
• The proposed model is extended to consider the effect of a)
LSEs for RAID5 arrays and b) RAID5 with spare disk.
• Models in [4] assume a 100% survivable storage system8, while
this work assumes the general case in which parts of data can
be non-survivable.
• For the first time, a novel metric, NOMDU, is proposed to assess
the availability of data storage systems.
• By considering the data object survivability as a model param-
eter, the proposed model reports availability and reliability in
terms of NOMDU and NOMDL.
• Monte Carlo simulation is used to assess NOMDU and
NOMDL, rather than Markov models, while time-to-failure and
time-to-repair is generated by considering Weibull distribution,
obtained from field data and state-of-the-art reports.
• Model presentation is revised to improve its understandability
and applicability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
represents background and related works. Section III elaborates the
6This data-center offers various Cloud-based services, web-hosting, col-
location, mail service, and HPC services to both universities and small to
medium-size corps.
7A modular DSS designed and fabricated by HPDS Corp. [26].
8A data object, stored in a DSS, is called survivable if it has a backup
or remote mirror, enabling data recovery in the case of local data loss [27].
Otherwise, it is called non-survivable.
human error analysis in disk arrays using Monte-Carlo simulations.
Section IV provides simulation results and the corresponding find-
ings. Lastly, Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Dependability Models of Data Storage Systems
Many research studies have tried to evaluate and improve the
reliability of data storage systems (in particular, disk subsystem) by
considering the failure cases that result in data loss [28], [29], [20],
[17], [18], [21], [22], [23], [30], [31]. Metrics of data reliability used
in the literature include a) MTTDL [28] which attempts to express the
average time between data loss events, b) DDF [29], [20], [17], [21]
which expresses the expected time between failures, c) percentage of
RAID array failures within mission time [22], and d) Magnitude of
Data Loss (MDL) [18] which is the amount of data (in bytes) that
is expected to be lost within mission time. The other dependability
parameter, data availability, expresses the fraction of time that data is
accessible by customers [32]. Dependability of data storage systems
can be significantly influenced by parameters such as the rate of
component failures, the rate of recovery mechanisms, and the struc-
ture of redundancy mechanism used to tolerate component failures.
A variety of redundancy and recovery techniques is employed in
data storage systems to mitigate the consequences of component
failures and decrease the probability of data unavailability and/or data
loss. These mechanisms usually come with considerable performance,
energy consumption, or cost overheads. Hence, designers manage to
use system-level dependability models to measure the effectiveness
of redundancy mechanisms applied to data storage systems reaching
cost-effective redundancy techniques.
B. Human Error in Safety-Critical Applications
Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) [33] techniques are devel-
oped to attain a better understandability and quantification of human
errors in a non-benign system. These techniques mainly focus on
quantifying hep which is simply defined by Equation 1 [7].
hep =
No. of error cases observed
No. of opportunities for human errors
(1)
By referring to hep values obtained by National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), European Organization for the
Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), and United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NUREG), it can be concluded that
the probability of human error is usually between 0.001 and 0.1
depending on the application and situation. However, for the most of
safety-critical and enterprise applications, the reported hep is in the
range of 0.001 and 0.01 [7], [8], [9], [6].
Finally, we can note studies inspecting and modeling the effect
of human errors in enterprise systems such as nuclear power plants
[34], [35], and studies trying to improve the maintenance and test
quality of enterprise systems, in favor of maintenance cost and
reliability/availability [36], [37].
C. Human Errors in Data Storage Systems
Human errors can threat the availability/reliability of DSSs in
different components and situations, however, in this work we in-
vestigate the effect of IDRS which is one of the most prevalent
types of human errors. Consider a RAID5 array with no spare disks,
in which the failed disk should be replaced by the brand-new disk
before starting the fail-over process. As shown in Fig. 1, the operator
may wrongly replace the brand-new disk with one of the operating
disks, rather than the failed one. This incidence, called IDRS, makes
3Fig. 1: An example: a human error in disk replacement process can
result in data unavailability in the disk array.
Fig. 2: An example: an LSE followed by a disk failure can result in
data loss in the LSE-affected sectors.
two disks, the wrongly removed one and the failed one, inaccessible,
resulting in the unavailability of the entire array. If the human error
is detected, the array will be available by undoing the incorrect disk
replacement. Otherwise, if the wrongly removed disk is damaged
before the detection and recovery of human error, the entire array
will be lost due to DDF.
D. LSE
Most studies in the field of data storage systems have focused
on the failure analysis of disks, including operational failures and
undetected errors [16], [38], [39], [40]. Operational failures occur
due to faults in electronic and mechanical components such as heads
and platters. These failures result in data destruction where disk head
is unable to find the requested data. Using RAID configurations is
a solution for alleviating the effect of operational failures on data
storage systems [41].
In addition to operational failures, other types of errors such as
bad head write and bit error can also damage disk sectors. Another
cause of sector errors is environmental particles which may be placed
between platter and head. In the case of a write operation, positioning
the disk head within track gaps can corrupt several sectors. These
types of errors, named LSEs, may lead to a data loss event upon
a disk failure [39], [14]. Fig. 2 shows how an LSE can result in
data loss in the case of a subsequent disk failure in the case of
RAID5. Suppose that a sector of disk A is affected by LSE. If
disk B fails before detection of recovery of LSE, the data of affected
sector in disk A cannot be recovered, as RAID5 can just tolerate
the failure of one disk. Error Correcting Code (ECC) [42], [43], disk
scrubbing [44], and intra-disk redundancy [45], [46] can be used to
reduce the probability of data corruption in the presence of LSEs.
The LSE rate of a disk drive may vary in time, depending on several
parameters such as disk age, disk model, and I/O characteristics [39].
We should note that some works on disk array reliability (such as
Venkatesan and Iliadis [30]) ignore the effect of LSEs that results in
misleading conclusions [18], [47], [16], [14], [19].
III. HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS IN DISK ARRAY
In this section, we model the dependability of disk arrays using
Monte Carlo simulations rather than conventional alternatives such as
MTTDL and Markov models due to their extensive limitations and
inaccuracies. Many previous studies have concluded that MTTDL
is an obsolete metric for reporting Data Loss [2], [18], [48], [49].
The disk arrays have infinite failure states (due to having infinite
combinations of sector failures, disk failures, and human errors) and
modeling them with a closed-form MTTDL expression, and even a
Markov chain is challenging and erroneous [50]. Furthermore, the
disk failure rate is a function of time that makes using Markov
chains erroneous [18], [47], while many previous works encourage
using alternatives such as Monte Carlo simulations that have not
this limitation [2], [18], [47], [16], [14], [19], [39]. In this section,
we first introduce NOMDU metric for evaluating the availability
of data storage systems. Afterwards, we propose our framework
for evaluating the dependability of RAID5 and RAID6 arrays by
considering disk failures, LSEs, and human errors. Finally, we discuss
the dependability of general erasure codes and how our proposed
framework can be employed for different code configurations.
A. NOrmalized Magnitude of Data Unavailability (NOMDU)
To access unavailability in a data storage systems, we need a
metric to be applicable and comparable in different storage capacities,
and contain the magnitude of unavailable data. The original avail-
ability/unavailability metric cannot be useful in the case of storage
systems, for two reasons:
Case A) Availability is a function of storage capacity, while a
storage system with a larger capacity but the same architecture will
have lower availability. Hence, different storage architectures with
different capacities cannot be compared using DU metric. We take
an example where two system engineers evaluate the availability
of two storage subsystems using conventional availability metric.
Assume Subsystem 1 (SS1) employs one RAID0(4 disks) array
and Subsystem 2 (SS2) employs two RAID0(4 disks) arrays, while
the arrays of both subsystems have exactly the same architecture
and components. Assume ADisk stands for the availability of each
disk, Aarray stands for the availability of one disk array, and ASS1
and ASS2 respectively stand for the availability of SS1 and SS2.
Regarding RAID0 configuration, the array is unavailable when at
least one of disks is unavailable. Moreover, in the conventional avail-
ability definition, when one of two arrays is unavailable, the whole
system is considered unavailable (as unavailability metric does not
deliver any information about the magnitude of data unavailability).
In summary, conventional availability of SS1 and SS2 is as follows:
ASS1 = A
4, ASS2 = A8
As the formulations of ASS1 and ASS2 show, the conventional
availability is a function of system scale. Hence, two systems with
exactly the same architecture but different scales have different
availability values. Moreover, the availability does not change linearly
with system capacity (system scale). Hence, the system engineers
cannot obtain the availability of SS1, by simply normalizing the
availability of SS2 to its capacity.
Case B) Unavailability metric cannot represent the magnitude of
unavailable data. In many failure cases, only a part of storage data is
unavailable, while the definition of storage availability/unavailability
is limited to the availability of whole data (the storage is considered
available when the whole data is available). We take an example to
elaborate this shortcoming of availability metric when used in data
storage systems. To this end, we evaluate the conventional availability
of a data storage system employing a single HDD and a true remote
backup (such as Cloud backup). Suppose two failure types of disk
failure and LSE are possible in a HDD with the following definitions:
a) disk failure: Time To Failure (TTF), Time To Recover (TTR), and b)
LSE: Time Between LSE (TBLSE), Time To LSE Recover (TTLSER).
The storage system is available when all its data is available,
i.e., when no unavailability is caused by disk failure and LSE:
ADSS = ADSS(DiskFailure)×ADSS(LSE) = TTFTTF+TTR × TBLSE−TTLSERTBLSE
The shortcoming of conventional availability metric, as shown
in above formulation, is that both HDD failure and LSE have the
same impact on system availability, while they cause totally different
4magnitude of data unavailability (the whole disk size versus a single
sector size).
Here we define NOMDU, as the duration of data unavailability
multiplied to the logical amount of unavailable data, normalized to
the mission time and logical capacity of storage system, as shown in
Equation 2. Hence, this metric can assess the availability of a storage
architecture, regardless of its size and mission time.
NOMDU =
∑
Logical Size of Unavailable Data×Unavailability Duration
Total Logical Storage Size×Mission Time
(2)
Following we calculate NOMDU for Case A and Case B (appeared
above) to demonstrate how NOMDU removes the problems of
conventional availability metric.
Case A) NOMDUSS1 = NOMDUSS2 = 1−A
Regarding Case A, two systems with the same architecture but
different scale have the same NOMDU, while they have different
conventional availability.
Case B) NOMDU = Capacitysector
Capacitydisk
× TTLSER
TBLSE
+ TTR
TTF+TTR
As the NOMDU formulation for Case B shows, the unavailability
caused by LSE and disk failure have different impact on NOMDU,
while their impact is proportional to the fraction of their capacity
over total storage capacity.
B. Dependability of RAID5 and RAID6, No LSE, No Automatic
Fail-over
1) RAID5 Analysis: Fig. 3 shows the proposed state diagram for
assessing DU/DL in a RAID5 disk subsystem by considering the
effect of disk failures and human errors. This model is evaluated using
Monte Carlo simulations, as using Markov models can be erroneous
due to its memoryless nature that prevents modeling non-exponential
failure distributions such as Weibull [51], [16].
We have the same convention in naming the states in all state
diagrams. The states in which the next failure results in DU/DL are
named EXP and the states in which the next failure does not result in
DU/DL are named OP. Upon the occurrence of the first disk failure,
the system state will move from the operational (OP ) to the exposed
state (EXP ). While being in the exposed state, a second disk failure
will lead to DL event whereas a human error during disk replacement
will lead to DU event. If the human agent successfully replaces the
failed disk with the brand-new one, the array goes to the EXPr state,
in which the disk fail-over can be started on the brand-new disk.
When the array is in the DU state, by recognizing the human error
and removing it, the array switches to the EXPr state, in which the
failed disk is correctly replaced by the brand-new one and the fail-
over process can be started. However, if the wrongly replaced disk
is crashed, a DDF happens and the array switches to the DL state.
The time to crash the wrongly replaced disk is considered to have
the distribution of dcrash. Per DU incidence i, NOMDU is evaluated
using Equation 3 and is added to the simulation statistics.
NOMDUi =
Logical Size of Unavailable Datai×Unavailability Durationi
Total Logical Storage Size×Mission Time
(3)
In this regard, Equation 2 is rephrased as follows:
NOMDU =
∑
i
NOMDUi (4)
Where NOMDU is normalized magnitude of data unavailability
within mission time, and NOMDUi is NOMDU imposed by DU
incidence i.
Finally, when the array is in the DL state, the whole array data
is lost due to DDF. In a non-survivable storage, that has no backup
and mirror, in this case the array data is permanently lost. Hence,
NOMDL is evaluated and added to the simulation statistics as shown
in Equation 5:
NOMDLnonsurvivablei =
Logical Size of Lost Datai
Total Logical Storage Size
(5)
Where NOMDLnonsurvivablei is normalized magnitude of data
loss imposed by non-survivable DL incidence i. In this regard,
NOMDL within mission time is the aggregation of NOMDL imposed
by individual DL incidence, as shown in Equation 6
NOMDL =
∑
i
NOMDLi (6)
In the case of DL in a survivable storage, that has at least one
up-to-date backup or mirror, the array data can be recovered from
the backup. In this case it takes Backup Recovery Time, dBR to
recover the data of lost array over the remote backup, while Backup
Recovery Time depends on the parameters such as the size of lost
data, backup throughput, array throughput, and network bandwidth.
The survived data is not lost in the user side, but is unavailable within
recovery time. Hence, NOMDU imposed by survivable DL incidence
i is evaluated as Equation 7.
NOMDUsurvivable DLi =
Logical Size of Lost Datai×Recovery Timei
Total Logical Storage Size×Mission Time
(7)
In general, we can consider Data Object Survivability (DOS) [27],
defined as the probability that a data object is survived during period
of time (t). DOS(t) can be statistically interpreted as follows. Per DL
incidence at the storage system level, a fraction of lost data, DOS(t),
has a correct backup at mission time t, while the rest of data (1 −
DOS(t) fraction of data) has no correct backup and is permanently
lost. NOMDL metric is projecting the data that is permanently lost
in the user side. Hence, in each DL incidence, NOMDL is a function
of DL magnitude (size of lost data at the storage system level) and
1 − DOS(t), i.e., the fraction of data that has no correct backup,
as shown in Equation 9. Moreover, in each DL incidence, DOS(t)
fraction of data is not permanently lost, as it is recoverable from
remote backups and mirrors. This fraction of data is just unavailable
(DU in the user side) within recovery time. Hence, imposed NOMDU
per DL incidence is a function of DL magnitude (the size of lost data
at the storage system level), DOS(t), and DL recovery time (from
backup), as shown in Equation 8.
NOMDUDLi = DOS(t)× Logical Size of Lost Datai×Recovery TimeiTotal Logical Storage Size×Mission Time
(8)
NOMDLi = (1−DOS(t))×Logical Size of Lost Datai
Total Logical Storage Size
(9)
Finally, total NOMDL and NOMDU per mission is evaluated
respectively by the aggregation of NOMDL and NOMDU within
mission time, as shown in Equation 6 and Equation 4, respectively.
2) RAID6 Analysis: The proposed model for RAID5 (Fig. 3)
is extended to assess DU/DL of a RAID6 array in the presence
of human errors and disk failures, as shown in Fig. 4. In the
RAID6 configuration, two redundant disks are used to tolerate two
consecutive disk failures. Hence, the data loss event happens in the
case of Triple Disk Failure (TDF). In the normal operation of a
RAID6 array (shown as OP+ state in Fig. 4), one and two disk
failures will bring the array to either OP1F and EXP2F states,
respectively. OP1F stands for the state in which one disk is failed,
but the array is still operational. In this state, another disk failure
moves the array to the EXP2F state. In the OP1F state, a successful
disk replacement moves the array to the OP1FR state, while an
unsuccessful disk replacement moves the array to EXPFH state.
5Fig. 3: State diagram of Monte Carlo simulation for RAID5 DU/DL,
considering no LSE.
The exposed state in this figure expresses that the array will
continue servicing read/write requests. However, in the case of
another disk failure before the performing the recovery process, a
TDF happens that results in DL. Assessing NOMDU and NOMDL
for each DU and DL incidence is similar to the case of RAID5
(Section III-B1). While the array is in the exposed state, a wrong
disk replacement can make the array unavailable. Additionally, while
the array is in OP+, a single disk failure followed by two consecutive
wrong disk replacements can make the array unavailable. If the disk
replacement is performed with no human error, the array goes back to
either OP1FR and EXP2FR states, when it is in OP1F and EXP2F
states respectively, while the occurrence of a human error in the disk
replacement changes the array state to either EXPFH and DUFFH
states. The array goes to DUFFH state when the combination of two
disk failures and one human error happens and goes to DUFHH state
when a disk failure is followed by two human errors.
EXP2F stands for the state in which two successive disk failures
happen. In this state, another disk failure moves the array to DLTDF
(triple disk failure). In the EXP2F state, two failed disks need to
be replaced by the brand-new ones, while we assume that both disks
are replaced simultaneously. A human error in the disk replacement
process, regardless it happened on one or both disks, moves the array
to the DUFFH state, while a successful disk replacement moves the
array to the EXP2FR state. In the EXP2FR state, the array has two
failed disks that are replaced with the brand-new ones, and the data
of two failed disks should be recovered using other n− 2 operating
disks. In this state, two disks can be recovered simultaneously, or
be recovered one after another. Both approaches take a minimum
time twice the minimum time of one disk recovery, while the latter
approach has reliability benefits, as after the recovery of the first
disk the array moves to OP1FR state and stays a shorter time in
the EXP2FR state. In the first approach, the array remains in the
EXP2FR until the recovery of both disks. Hence, we take the latter
approach in our simulations, as shown in Fig. 4. Finally, DUFFH
stands for the state in which user data is unavailable due to two disk
failures and one human error in the array. In this state, by recovering
from human error the array moves to the EXP2FR state. However,
if the wrongly removed disk crashes, the array moves to the DLTDF
state (triple disk failure).
C. Dependability of RAID5 Considering LSE
The model presented in Fig. 3 is extended to include LSE, as well
as disk failures and IDRS, shown in Fig. 5. In the case a disk failure
is followed by a human error, DU happens which can be assessed
as described in Section III-B. DL is another possible incidence when
two consecutive disk failures or the combination of LSE and disk
failure (on two different disks) happen.
In the OP state, all disks are operating with no LSE. An opera-
tional disk failure switches the array state to the EXP state, while
the time to transition from OP to EXP is a function of number
of disks, n, and the distribution of time to disk failure, dDF . The
array switches from OP state to EXPLSE state when one or more
LSEs happen. The LSE can be recovered by data scrubbing, while
the time to scrub, with the distribution of dScrub depends on the
storage maintenance policies and can have a minimum value which
depends on the array throughput [16]. A disk failure after an LSE on
a different disk results in the loss of data which is damaged by LSE
(state DLFLSE). Elerath and Pecht [16] take this incidence as DDF,
while it has a different magnitude of data loss (and consequently a
different recovery time in the case of survivable array) compared to
DDF, resulting DL and DU overestimation. The survivable sectors
can be recovered from backups while the distribution of time to
recover sectors from backups, dSBR is a function of the number
of lost sectors, backup throughput, array throughput, and network
speed9. In the DLFLSE state, by assuming DOS(t) as the data
survivability, the NOMDL and NOMDU imposed by DL incidence
i is evaluated respectively by Equation 9 and Equation 8, while the
Logical Size of Lost Data is equal to the Size of Sectors Affected by
LSE.
A transition from EXPLSE state to EXP state is possible when
the only disk affected by LSE fails. The time to failure of LSE
affected disk can be different from operating disks, as it can have
alternative causes such as Excessive Block Reallocation and can be
measured using field data [16], while it has no explicit rate and is
included in dDF [16]. Hence, the time to transition from EXPLSE
to EXP also follows dDF . When one of n − 1 LSE-free disks
fails, the combination of LSE and disk failure moves the array from
EXPLSE to DLFLSE , where time to transition is a function of
n − 1 and dDF . Note if more than one disk is affected by LSEs, a
consequent failure of any disk moves the array to DLFLSE (hence,
the time to transition is a function of n rather than n− 1) and there
is no transition from EXPLSE to EXP 10. Hence, both transitions
from EXPLSE to EXP and DLFLSE is also a function of L, the
number of disks affected by LSE.
In EXP and EXPr states, the occurrence of LSE before the
completion of disk replacement or disk recovery can move the array
to DLFLSE . However, Elerath and Pecht [16] express that this
transition has a low probability and ignore it.
DLFF and DU states are the same as DL and DU states in
Fig. 3, while the imposed NOMDL and NOMDU can be assessed by
Equation 9 and Equation 8 in the case of DLFF , and in the case of
DU , NOMDU can be assessed by Equation 3.
D. Dependability of RAID5 With Automatic Fail-over Considering
LSE
The final model presented in this section belongs to RAID5 array
with hot spare disk, in which the delayed disk replacement policy is
employed. In this policy, the disk replacement is performed after the
completion of automatic recovery (to the spare disk), when the single
9Here we can note a limitation of Markov model over Monte Carlo
simulations; The Markov model cannot hold the number of LSEs, and
consequently cannot accurately model the recovery time, as well as the
magnitude of data loss. It mandates taking simplified assumptions in Markov
models, such as assuming that only one sector is affected by LSE.
10 This case also cannot be accurately modeled by Markov, as the Markov
cannot recognize whether only one disk is affected by LSEs.
6Fig. 4: State diagram of Monte Carlo simulation for assessing RAID6 DU/DL.
Fig. 5: State diagram of Monte Carlo simulation for assessing
RAID5 DU/DL, considering LSE.
point of failure is removed. Hence, this policy forbids the human error
following disk failure which results in DU in the case of no spare
(Section III-C). The state diagram for obtaining DU/DL using Monte
Carlo simulations is appeared in Fig. 6.
Upon a disk failure, the array moves from OP to either EXP
and DLFF upon the first and second disk failures, respectively.
In the EXP state, the automatic recovery starts on the spare
disk, by distribution dDF , while the service agent has to forbid
changing the failed disk with brand-new one, before the completion
of recovery. After recovery, the array moves to OPns, where the array
is operational but no spare disk is available. In this state, failed disk
replacement can be performed by the service agent. The successful
disk replacement moves the array back to the OP state, while the
human error moves the array to EXPhe state. In the EXPhe state,
one operating disk is removed due to human error and the array is
working with n−1 operating disks. In this state, another disk failure
and an LSE moves the array to either DUFH and DUHLSE states,
respectively, while a successive human error in disk replacement
moves the array to DUHH states. In the DUFH and DUHH states,
the whole array is unavailable while in the DUHLSE state, only
Fig. 6: State diagram of Monte Carlo simulation for RAID5 DU/DL
with automatic fail-over, considering LSE.
the sectors affected by LSE are unavailable and the Logical Size of
Unavailable Data is equal to the Size of Sectors Affected by LSE. The
imposed NOMDU by DUFH , DUHH , and DUHLSE incidences is
obtained by Equation 3.
In OPns state, a disk failure and LSE moves the array to
either EXPns and EXPLSEns states, respectively. In EXPns
and EXPLSEns states the array has no spare, while successful
replacement of the failed disk moves the array to either EXP
and EXPLSE states, respectively. Unsuccessful disk replacement in
7EXPns and EXPLSEns states results in DU, moving the array to
either DUFH and DUHLSE state, respectively.
E. Monte Carlo Simulation
In the MC simulations, the disk failure and LSE incidences are gen-
erated by assuming the desired failure distributions such as Weibull
and exponential. After a disk failure occurrence, the recovery time
is evaluated depending on the defined average recovery distribution.
Fig. 7 illustrates an example of the MC simulation for a RAID5
(3 + 1) array. In case of DDF, i.e., two consecutive disk failures in
the same array while the second failure is before the recovery of the
first failure, a DL event happens (at 407 and 893 in Fig. 7), while the
DL is recovered from backup if happened on survivable data (time
407) or is permanently lost if happened on non-survivable data (time
893).
In the case of single disk failure, the failed disk is replaced by
a human agent. However, the occurrence of a human error in the
disk replacement process, by the probability of hep, makes another
working disk unavailable, resulting in the unavailability of the entire
data array (time 326). The combination of LSE with disk failure and
human error result in DL and DU, respectively. For example, at time
610 an LSE happen on disk2, while the failure of disk1 at time
648 results DL in the affected sectors, mandating the recovery of
lost sectors from backup. Disk scrubbing is periodically performed
on each disk and removes LSEs, while the exact time of removing
each LSE is defined by considering a uniform distribution between
start-time and end-time of scrubbing. For example, at time 500 an
LSE happen on disk1 that is removed by scrubbing at time 530.
NOMDU and NOMDL is evaluated for each failure incidence,
and is aggregated within mission time.
The error of MC simulations is inversely proportional to the root
square of the number of iterations as shown in Equation 10. The
number of iterations can be adjusted by the target accuracy (error)
and the given confidence level. Error of Monte Carlo simulation is
obtained by Equation 10 [52].
ErrorMonte Carlo =
δ × Zα/2√
n
(10)
In Equation 10, n is the number of iterations (in our case n =
number of simulated arrays = 1000), δ is the standard deviation
of the target values (NOMDU and NOMDL in our case), and Zα/2
is the t-student coefficient for a target confidence level [52].
F. Monte Carlo Transitions
The MC simulations can be applied to any failure and repair distri-
bution, including exponential and Weibull. Elerath and Schindler [15]
consider a two-parameter Weibull distribution for time to disk fail-
ures, LSEs, recovery of disk failures, and scrubbing, and show that
this distribution better corroborates the field data, compared to the
exponential distribution. This distribution assumes the probability
density function as shown in Equation 11 where t is time, η is
the characteristic life, γ is location parameter, and β is the shape
parameter [53].
f(t) =
(
β
η
)(
t− γ
η
)β−1
exp
[
−
(
t− γ
η
)β]
(11)
We use the base parameters obtained from field data by Elerath and
Schindler [15], as shown in Table I. Note as Elerath and Schindler use
two-parameter Weibull, we need to consider γ = 0 when applying
Table I parameters to Equation 11.
TABLE I: Disk Failure, Disk Failure Reconstruct, LSE, and Scrub-
bing Weibull distribution parameters for three disk models from
10,000 storage systems in the field [15]. Disk A and Disk B are
1TB near-line SATA models and have been in the field for average
3 years, and Disk C is an enterprise-class FC 288GB model and has
been in the field for average 5 years.
Disk Model Disk Failure (dDF ) Recovery (dRec) LSE (dLSE ) Scrubbing (dScrub)
ηDF βDF ηRec βRec ηLSE βLSE ηScrub βScrub
SATA Disk A 302,016 1.13 22.7 1.65 12,325 1 186 1
SATA Disk B 4,833,522 0.576 20.25 1.15 42,857 1 160 0.97
FC/SCSI Disk C 1,058,364 0.721 6.75 1.4 50,254 1 124 2.1
TABLE II: Human error parameters from field data and interview
with datacenter technicians.
Disk Replacement (dDR) Human Error Recovery (dHER) Crash Wrongly Replaced Disk (dCrash)
ηDR βDR ηHER βHER ηCrash βCrash
0.5 2 1 2 8760 1.4
For disk replacement and human error recovery, we also cannot
assume a constant rate (exponential distribution), as by this assump-
tion the probability of disk replacement and human error recovery
in any time interval with the equal size is the same, which is not
realistic. Hence, we also use Weibull distribution for disk replacement
and human error recovery. The time to disk replacement, with the
distribution of dDR, has no minimum value, as the human agent
can change the failed disk immediately after its failure. Hence,
we consider minimum time of 0 hours for the location parameter
(γ = 0). We consider shape parameter (β) of 2 to have a right-skewed
distribution, similar to the disk restore distribution. We consider the
characteristic life of half an hour (η = 0.5), obtained from the storage
service logs of Sharif University of Technology [24] datacenter, as a
typical expected time for the failed disk replacement.
Time to recognize and recover the human error is denoted by
dHER. As the human error can be recognized and recovered im-
mediately, we consider minimum time of 0 hours for the location
parameter (γ = 0). The shape parameter of 2 is considered to
have a right-skewed distribution, and the characteristic life of one
hour (η = 1) is considered regarding our storage service logs and
interviews with datacenter technicians. Time to crash the wrongly
replaced disk is generated by considering the shape parameter 1.4,
and the characteristic life of one year (η = 8760), obtained by our
storage service logs. The location parameter is 0 (γ = 0), as the
wrongly replaced disk can be immediately thrown away. The Weibull
parameters corresponding to disk replacement and human error is
appeared in Table II.
Time to backup recovery in the case of DL in survivable stor-
age, dBR, can also be characterized by a three-parameter Weibull
distribution. In the case of DDF, the data of two failed disks is
obtained from the backup. An alternative is to obtain the data of the
first failed disk from the backup, afterwards, reconstruct the second
failed disk using the XOR of n − 1 operating disks of the array.
Assuming a network connection of 1Gbps between the storage and
backup, and considering the array has eight 500GB SATA disks with
50MBps speed, obtaining the data of failed disk from backup takes
10 hours. Considering the disks are connected to a 1.5Gbps data
bus, it also takes 10.4 hours to reconstruct the failed disk using
the XOR of n − 1 operating disks of the array [16]. Hence, a
minimum time of 20 hours is required to recover a DDF from backup
(γ = 20). We consider twice of the minimum recovery time as the
characteristic life (η = 40), and consider the shape parameter of
2, to have a right skewed distribution. In the case of DL in disk
sectors, caused by LSE, the distribution of recovery time, dSBR,
depends on the size of lost sectors. As one sector typically has an
small size of 4KB, the minimum backup recovery time depends
on the minimum disk response time and the network delay, while
8TABLE III: Data loss recovery parameters from field data and
interview with datacenter technicians.
Backup Recovery (dBR) Sector Backup Recovery (dSBR)
γBR ηBR βBR γSBR ηSBR βSBR
20 40 2 2.7× 10−7 5.5× 10−7 2
we consider one millisecond for minimum sector recovery from the
backup (γ = 2.7× 10−7), two millisecond for the characteristic life
(η = 5.5 × 10−7), and the shape parameter of 2 (β = 2) to have a
right skewed distribution. The Weibull parameters corresponding to
dBR and dSBR are appeared in Table III.
G. Applying Proposed Model to General Erasure Codes
In the previous subsection, we discussed the effect of human errors
in RAID5 and RAID6 arrays and clarified how we use Monte Carlo
simulations to obtain NOMDL and NOMDU for a specific array
architecture by considering disk failures, LSEs, and human errors.
However, both RAID5 and RAID6 schemes are in the category
of Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes. Many alternatives of
MDS codes are proposed in the recent years to cope with failure types
observed in HDD and SSD arrays. Hence, it is of great importance
that our proposed Monte Carlo framework cope with MDS codes in
general case.
MDS codes, proposed in 70th, offer the maximum possible ham-
ming distance (hence, the maximum correction capability) while be-
ing separable, and have many alternatives such as Parity codes, Reed-
Solomon codes [54], [55], or array codes, such as EVENODD [29],
RDP [56], X-codes [57], B-codes [58], HVD codes [59], Liberation
codes [60], STAIR codes [61], Sector-Disk Codes [62], and Partial-
MDS codes [63]. RAID5 and RAID6 configurations are also in
the MDS category by keeping respectively one and two redundant
parities to respectively cope with one and two device failures in
a disk array. In a RAID5 configuration, a row-wise code-word
(Parity code) is stored in a redundant data chunk (or in general, data
symbol). The redundant data alongside the actual data constitutes
a data stripe. Blaum et al. [63] propose a Partial-MDS code that
uses the conventional row-wise parity alongside a new concept of
Global Parity to cope with the combination of both device failures
and symbol failures. In general, we have a linear [mn,m(n−r)−s]
code where m is the number of rows per stripe (code-word), n is
the number devices in a stripe (including redundant devices), r is the
number of redundant devices, and s is the number of global parities,
as shown in Fig 8.
In Partial-MDS codes (Fig. 8), the P (Parity) symbols are taken
row-wise, while G (Global Parity) symbols are taken globally from
all array members. Blaum et al. [63], Plank and Blaum [62], and Li
and Lee [61] propose different approaches for encoding/decoding of
Global parities by different complexities and I/O overhead. This code
can cope with r device failures and s symbol failures in each code-
word. We can put RAID5 in the category of Partial-MDS codes by
considering r = 1 and s = 0. Similarly, we can put RAID6 in
the category of Partial-MDS codes by considering r = 2 and s = 0.
Briefly, we use the term PMDS(m,n, r, s) to refer to a Partial-MDS
code with m rows, n devices, r row parities, and s global parities.
1) Overheads of General Erasure Codes: Depending on the
number of row parities and global parities, PMDS codes come
with different I/O overhead, computational complexity, and Effective
Replication Factor (ERF11), while the computational complexity and
ERF is analyzed in the previous work [61], [62], [63]. In general,
ERF of PMDS(m,n, r, s) is calculated by Equation 12.
11ERF stands for the ratio of storage physical capacity over storage logical
(useful) capacity.
TABLE IV: Assumptions of employing PMDS(m,n, r, s).
PMDS(m,n, r, s)
m: number of rows per stripe (codeword)
n: number of devices per array (number of chunks per stripe)
r: number of row parities (redundant devices)
s: number of global parities (redundant sectors) per stripe
ERF [PMDS(m,n, r, s)] =
m× n
m× (n− r)− s (12)
2) Dependability Analysis of General Erasure Codes: In the
general case, we can consider four failure types for a disk array:
• Array Data Loss (ADL): This failure is similar to what we
previously called DDF in the case of RAID5, and TDF in the
case of RAID6, in which the whole array is lost.
• Stripe Data Loss (SDL): is named after the failure case in which
one or multiple stripes of disk array is lost.
• Array Data Unavailability (ADU): is named after the failure
case in which the whole array is unavailable due to human errors
(IDRS).
• Stripe Data Unavailability (SDU): is named after the failure
case in which one or multiple stripes of disk array is unavailable
due to human errors (IDRS).
Consider employing PDMS(m,n, r, s) in a disk array as detailed
in Table IV. By considering the definitions shown in Table V, the
conditions of ADL, SDL, ADU , and SDU failures are summarized
in Table VI. ADL happens in a very simple condition, when the
number of failed devices (DF ) surpasses r (the number of redundant
devices). SDL happens when ADL condition is not satisfied, but
there exist at least one stripe in which the number of LSEs surpasses
the maximum correctable LSEs.ADU happens when ADL condition
is not satisfied, but the aggregation of failed devices (DF ) and
unavailable devices by human error (HE) surpasses r. Note it is
possible that both ADU and SDL conditions are satisfied in some
cases, when the whole array is unavailable while some of array stripes
is lost. Finally, SDU happens when ADU and ADL conditions are
not satisfied and at least one stripe exists in which the number of
LSEs does not surpass the maximum correctable LSEs, but its data
is unavailable due to human error. Note it is possible that both SDU
and SDL conditions are satisfied in some cases, when the array has
at least one unavailable stripe and at least one lost stripe.
We conduct Monte Carlo simulations using the framework de-
scribed in Section III-E and check the failure conditions appeared in
Table VI to recognize ADL, SDL, ADU , and SDU failure cases.
For each failure case, we record the size of lost data (in the case
of ADL and SDL) or size of unavailable data and unavailability
duration (in the case of ADU and SDU ), and finally calculate
NOMDU and NOMDL at the end of simulation using Equation 3
through Equation 9.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
Monte Carlo simulations are conducted for 1000 arrays of
RAID5(7+1) and the Weibull parameters appeared in Section III-F
(Table I, Table II, and Table III). Each experiment simulates 10
years (87600 hours) of mission time. The Monte Carlo simulator
is implemented from scratch in C++ with respect to the logic
represented in Section III-E. The results of this section are obtained
for a non-survivable storage system (the definition of survivable
storage systems and non-survivable storage systems is clarified in
Section III-B), hence, the recovery from DL states is not possible
(in Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and Fig 6, transition from DLFLSE ,
DLFF , and DLTDF states to OP state, appeared in dashed-line,
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TABLE V: Definitions for assessing dependability of PMDS(m,n, r, s)
V : set of array stripes
DF : number of failed devices
HE: number of unavailable (wrongly removed) devices due to human error (IDRS)
NUMLSE(i, v): number of LSEs (lost sectors) in chunk (device) i of stripe v (0 for failed devices)
MAX(i, v): device number (excluding failed devices) having ith maximumnumber of LSEs in stripe v
MAXOP (i, v): operational device number (excluding unavailable and failed devices) having ith maximumnumber of LSEs in stripe v
OP (i): 1, device i is operational (neither unavailable nor failed), 0, otherwise
TABLE VI: Failure conditions in PMDS(m,n, r, s)
Failure Conditions in PMDS(m,n, r, s)
ADL r < DF
SDL (DF ≤ r) ∧ (∃v ∈ V [s+
∑r−DF
i=1
NUMLSE(MAX(i, v), v) <
∑n
i=1
NUMLSE(i, v)])
ADU (DF ≤ r) ∧ (r < DF +HE)
SDU (0 < HE) ∧ (DF +HE ≤ r) ∧ (∃v ∈ V [(
∑n
i=1
NUMLSE(i, v) ≤ s+
∑r−DF
i=1
NUMLSE(MAX(i, v), v)) ∧ (s+
∑r−DF−HE
i=1
NUMLSE(MAXOP (i, v), v) <
∑n
i=1
NUMLSE(i, v)×OP (i))])
Fig. 8: Scheme of Partial-MDS codes
is impossible). In this regard, NOMDU and NOMDL are obtained
respectively by Equation 3 and Equation 5.
B. Validating Monte Carlo Implementation
This is the first attempt of modeling the effect of human errors
in data storage systems. Hence, to validate the Monte Carlo imple-
mentation, we compare the TDF within mission time obtained by
our Monte Carlo implementation considering no human errors, with
the Monte Carlo results obtained by Elerath and Schindler [15] for
RAID6 array. In this comparison, we conduct the experiments for
1000 RAID6(14+2) array groups and consider all data loss events,
including DF+LSE+LSE, DF+DF+LSE, and DF+DF+DF, as TDF
(Elerath and Schindler [15] follow the same approach and consider all
possible combinations of disk failure and LSE that result in data loss
as TDF). In Fig. 9, our simulation results for 10-years mission time
is drawn versus the results by Elerath and Schindler [15] for Disk
A, Disk B, and Disk C models (considering the parameters appeared
in Table I). As Fig. 9 shows, our Monte Carlo simulations report
slightly higher TDF values compared to previous work (on average
11%).
Fig. 9: Monte Carlo simulation results for 10-years mission time,
drawn on the results by Elerath and Schindler [15], for 1000
RAID6(14 + 2) arrays of Disk A, Disk B, and Disk C.
We also compare the DDF within mission time obtained by our
Monte Carlo implementation considering no human errors, with the
results obtained by Elerath and Pecht [17], [16] for RAID5 array. In
this comparison, we conduct the experiments for 1000 RAID5(7+1)
groups and consider both LSE+DF and DF+DF incidences as DDF
(Elerath and Pecht [17], [16] follow the same approach and consider
all possible combinations of disk failure and LSE that result in data
loss as DDF). Hence, in the state diagram of Fig. 5, transition to
both DLFLSE and DLFF states is considered as DDF incidence.
Table VII compares the number of DDFs reported by Elerath and
Pecht [17], [16] with the results of our simulation for the first year of
mission time. In Fig. 10, our simulation results for 10-years mission
time is drawn versus the results by Elerath and Pecht [17], [16].
As the figure shows, for ηScrub = 12, 48, and 168 hours, our Monte
Carlo simulations report greater number of DDFs, while for ηScrub =
10
TABLE VII: Comparing our Monte Carlo implementation results with
Elerath and Pecht [16] in the first year of mission time for different
time to scrub, in terms of number of DDF incidences.
Time to Scrub DDF by our Implementation DDF by Elerath and Pecht [17], [16]
η = 336 hours 20 21
η = 168 hours 12 11
η = 48 hours 5 5
η = 12 hours 2 1
Fig. 10: Monte Carlo simulation results for 10 years mission time,
drawn on the results by Elerath and Pecht [17], [16], for different
time to scrub (ηScrub). The simulations are conducted by the same
basic parameters as Elerath and Pecht [17], [16]: γDF = 0, ηDF =
461386, βDF = 1.12, γRec = 6, ηRec = 12, βRec = 2, γLSE = 0,
ηLSE = 9259, βLSE = 1, γScrub = 6, ηScrub = 168, βScrub = 3.
336 hours, the model of Elerath and Pecht predicts greater number
of DDFs. In summary, the difference of our Monte Carlo simulation
results with the results by Elerath and Pecht is 56%, 13%, 1.3%, and
9%, respectively for ηScrub = 12, 48, 168, and 336 hours.
C. Effect of Human Error in Non-survivable Storage System
Fig. 11 reports NOMDU and NOMDL for RAID5 array, obtained
by the model appeared in Fig. 5. The experiments are conducted
for 1000 RAID5(7 + 1) arrays of Disk A, Disk B, and Disk C
(Table I). We differentiate NOMDL caused by DDF and LSE+DF,
respectively appeared in Fig. 11(b) and Fig. 11(c). Fig. 11(a) shows
that by increasing hep by one order of magnitude, NOMDU almost
increases by one order of magnitude. Meanwhile, increasing hep has
less impact on NOMDL caused by DDF, and negligible impact on
NOMDL caused by DF+LSE. By increasing hep from 0 to 0.001,
the increase of both NOMDL caused by DDF and NOMDL caused
by DF+LSE is negligible for all disk types. By increasing hep from 0
to 0.01 and 0.1, NOMDL caused by DF+LSE increases respectively
by 1.0002x and 1.002x in arrays of disk A, 1.01x and 1.2x in arrays
of disk B, and 1.07x and 1.8x in arrays of disk C. By increasing
hep from 0 to 0.01 and 0.1, NOMDL caused by DDF increases
respectively by 4.7x and 38x in arrays of disk A, 2x and 10x in arrays
of disk B, and 5.3x and 44x in arrays of disk C. We can conclude that
human error increases NOMDU by one order of magnitude, while
it has no impact on NOMDL when hep is below 0.001, and this
observation is almost regardless of disk type. However, when hep
reaches 0.01 and beyond, it dramatically increases DL within mission
time.
Another important observation is that NOMDL caused by LSE is
five orders of magnitude smaller than NOMDL caused by DDF, while
our simulation results show that LSE causes more than 90% of all DL
incidences. We can explain this observation by different magnitudes
of data loss in DDF and DF+LSE incidences. While DDF makes
the whole array lost, DF+LSE results in data loss of one or multiple
(a) NOMDU
(b) NOMDL-DDF
(c) NOMDL-DF+LSE
Fig. 11: NOMDU and NOMDL caused by human errors for three
different disk types (Table I) and different hep. The experiments are
conducted for 1000 RAID5(7+1) arrays. We differentiate NOMDL
caused by DDF and LSE+DF, respectively appeared in sub-figures b
and c.
stripes. This observation concludes that the approach proposed by
Elerath and Pecht [16], [17] in taking both DDF and DF+LSE the
same will result in serious DL overestimation.
D. Availability Comparison of RAID Configurations with Equivalent
Usable Capacity
In this section we investigate whether human errors can change our
conventional assumptions about the dependability of different RAID
configurations. To this end, we compare NOMDL and NOMDU of
RAID5(3+1), RAID5(7+1), and RAID1(1+1) configurations,
considering equivalent usable (logical) capacity.
1) Applying the RAID5 dependability Models to RAID1:
RAID1 system is implemented by mirroring the disk data in a
redundant disk. Hence, it can be modeled as a one-failure tolerant
system. Similar to RAID5, the data is lost in the case of DDF and
disk failure combined with LSE, and the data is unavailable in the
case of human error in disk failure recovery process. As such, the
DU and DL is evaluated by the models presented in Section III-C
and Section III-D, by considering n = 2.
Fig. 12 compares the availability of three different RAID config-
urations with equivalent usable (logical) capacity, in the presence of
human errors. The results are obtained for a storage by the usable
capacity of 21000 disks, for three following configurations: a) 7000
RAID5(3+1) arrays, b) 3000 RAID5(7+1) arrays, and c) 21000
RAID1(1 + 1) arrays.
Comparing the three RAID configurations by assuming no human
errors (hep = 0) shows that RAID1(1 + 1) results in lower
NOMDL compared to RAID5(3 + 1) and RAID5(7 + 1), while
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(a) NOMDU
(b) NOMDL-DDF
(c) NOMDL-DF+LSE
Fig. 12: NOMDU and NOMDL caused by human errors for different
RAID configurations with equivalent usable capacity. The experi-
ments are conducted for 21000 RAID1 arrays, 7000 RAID5(3+1)
arrays, and 3000 RAID5(7 + 1) arrays of Disk A (Table I). We
differentiate NOMDL caused by DDF and LSE+DF, respectively
appeared in sub-figures b and c.
RAID5(7 + 1) has higher NOMDL compared to RAID5(3 + 1).
This observation corroborates our conventional belief that higher
redundancy results in higher dependability. However, by consid-
ering the effect of human errors, we observe RAID1(1 + 1)
configuration shows higher NOMDU compared to both RAID5
configurations, while RAID5(7 + 1) shows the lowest NOMDU.
This can be described by the higher Effective Replication Factor12
(ERF) of RAID1(1 + 1) (ERF = 2) compared to RAID5(3 + 1)
(ERF = 1.33) and RAID5(7+1) (ERF = 1.14), which mandates
employing higher number of disks for a specific usable capacity,
increasing the chance of disk failure and consequently, human errors.
Another observation is that by increasing hep to 0.01 and be-
yond, NOMDL caused by DDF in RAID1(1 + 1) surpasses both
RAID5(7+1) and RAID5(3+1). It means that in the environments
with high probability of human errors, RAID1 is not only less
available than RAID5, but also less reliable.
E. Effect of Automatic Disk Fail-over Policy
In this section, we report the effect of the automatic fail-over
with hot-spare disk, when the service agent follows delayed disk
replacement policy, as described in Section III-D. Fig. 13 compares
12The ratio of storage physical size to the logical (usable) size [64].
(a) NOMDU
(b) NOMDL-DDF
(c) NOMDL-DF+LSE
Fig. 13: NOMDU and NOMDL caused by human errors for conven-
tional RAID5 configuration and RAID5 with hot spare disk and
delayed disk replacement policy. The experiments are conducted for
1000 RAID5(7 + 1) arrays of Disk A (Table I). We differentiate
NOMDL caused by DDF and LSE+DF, respectively appeared in sub-
figures b and c.
the NOMDU and NOMDL of basic RAID5 array and RAID5 with
hot-spare disk (for 1000 arrays of disk A). As the results show, using
automatic fail-over policy can significantly moderate the effect of
human errors. For example, assuming hep = 0.00001, automatic fail-
over decreases NOMDU by five orders of magnitude as compared to
the conventional RAID. Another observation is that automatic fail-
over policy can also decrease NOMDL caused by human errors. The
hep of 0.01 and 0.1 respectively increases NOMDL by 4.7x and 38x
compared to the case of no human error, while by using automatic
fail-over policy, hep of 0.01 and 0.1 increases NOMDL by 1.04x and
5.2x, respectively, as shown in Fig. 13(b).
F. Comparison with Previous Models and Field Data
In this section, we compare the results of our proposed model
(considering human errors) for RAID5 array with the previous
RAID5 reliability models, including conventional MTTDL model
by Gibson [28], NOMDL by Greenan [18], and DDF by Elerath
and Pecht [17], where none of them consider the effect of human
error and subsequent DU/DL. Table VIII compares previous disk
array reliability models with the proposed model for 1000 arrays
of RAID5(7 + 1) and 10 years mission time for Disk A, Disk B,
and Disk C. In this comparison, we assume a non-survivable storage
system (clarified in Section III-B1) with no spare disk and typical
value hep=0.001, while the rest of model parameters is appeared in
Table I and Table II.
As reported in Table VIII, only the proposed model considers the
effect of human errors and corresponding DU. As an example, the
proposed model reports that for RAID5(7 + 1) arrays of Disk A,
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TABLE VIII: Comparison of previous disk array reliability models
with the proposed model for 1000 arrays of RAID5(7 + 1) and 10
years mission time. We assume typical value hep = 0.001 and no
spare disk in this comparison, while the rest of model parameters is
appeared in Table I, Table II, and Table III. None of previous models
consider the effect of human errors on DU/DL.
Disk Array Reliability Model DL DUDisk A Disk B Disk C Disk A Disk B Disk C
NOMDL/NOMDU (Proposed) 10 years Bytes lost per usable TB Bytes unavailable per hour per usable TB5567 20871 5276 113 79 118
NOMDL (Greenan [18]) 10 years Bytes lost per usable TB Not considered4355 19374 4031 - - -
DDF (Elerath [17], [16]) 10 years Number of DDF incidences Not considered169 35 1 - - -
MTTDL (Gibson [28]) 10 years MTTDL years Not considered8 18 17 - - -
5567 bytes data loss is expected per 1TB of data, in a 10-years
mission. It also reports that for RAID5(7 + 1) arrays of Disk A,
113 bytes are expected to be unavailable per 1TB of data per hour
(as NOMDU value is normalized to mission time). NOMDL by
Greenan reports that for RAID5(7 + 1) arrays of Disk A, 4355
bytes data loss is expected per 1TB of data, in a 10-years mission.
NOMDL by Greenan is slightly lower, due to the effect of DL
caused by human errors considered in our proposed model. DDF by
Elerath reports that for 1000 RAID5(7 + 1) arrays of Disk A, 169
DDF incidences happen in a 10-years mission. However, the DDF
value has no information about how many of DDFs are caused by
DF+DF (that results in the whole array data loss) and how many
are caused by DF+LSE (that results in one/multiple stripe data loss).
DDF is also a function of examined arrays, 1000 in this case, while
NOMDL and NOMDU are normalized to the storage usable capacity
and are independent of the number of examined arrays. Finally,
MTTDL by Gibson reports 8-years mean time to data loss for 1000
RAID5(7 + 1) arrays of Disk A. This metric has no information
about the expected number of failures, the amount of data loss, and
the effect of human errors.
Finally, to further show the shortcoming of previous works in
neglecting the effect of human errors, we compare the proposed
model results with previous work and field data from enterprise-
level storage products of a leading storage system manufacturer and
storage service provider (here we call this company by CorpX), as
shown in Table IX. Field statistics on the failures of four enterprise-
level storage series of this company roughly report that 15% of all
data loss and data unavailability is caused by human errors.
As this comparison shows, the DL prediction of Greenan [18]
and Elerath [17], [16] method is lower than the proposed model, as
Greenan and Elerath predict no DL caused by human errors (they just
consider DL caused by device failure and LSE). Consequently, total
DL reported by the proposed model is 13% greater than Elerath [17],
[16] and Greenan [18]. The more significant shortcoming of previous
works, however, is ignoring the effect of data unavailability caused by
human errors. The CorpX field data reports that 15% of total storage
unavailability is caused by human errors, while the previous models
do not consider the human error impact by any means. Comparing
the proposed model results with the field data shows that total DL
reported by the proposed model is in the same order with the field
data when we choose hep = 0.001 and ηcrash = 10h. We are
satisfied with this result, as CorpX also reports the average human
error probability in the same range (0.02% to 0.1%). These results
are reported for RAID5(7+1) configuration while the field data for
other erasure codes are not available. The field statistics of Data Loss
breakdown, obtained by DeepSpar [65] (a data recovery firm) from a
survey of 50 data recovery firms shows that 12% of data loss in disk
subsystems is caused by human errors [65]. This statistics is also in
the same order with the proposed model results. The proposed model
Fig. 14: Markov Model for RAID5 DU/DL, considering LSE.
shows 12.8% of DL is caused by human errors when considering
hep=0.001. We can conclude that by considering hep = 0.001, the
proposed model results are accurate estimate to the field reports. This
observation corroborates our previous hep evaluation based on human
error statistics from Sharif data-center and related reports on human
errors in the field.
G. Comparison of Monte Carlo Simulation and Markov Model
In this section, we compare the results obtained from Markov
model with Monte Carlo simulations. In this regard, Markov model of
RAID5 array (assuming no spare disk and not survivable data, i.e.,
DOS(t) = 0) is solved by algebraic approach and then NOMDU
and NOMDL are obtained. The Markov model state diagram is
same as Monte Carlo simulation state diagram (shown in Fig. 5)
by considering exponential failure distribution (rather than Weibull
distribution used in Monte Carlo simulations), with transition rates
appeared in Fig. 14. The model parameters are appeared in Table I,
Table II, and Table III for Weibull distribution.
To have a fair comparison between Monte Carlo simulation and
Markov models, we justify MTTF/MTTR in exponential distribution
to result in the same number of failures as Weibull distribution does in
a 10-years mission time. In this regard, both Weibull and exponential
distributions should have the same Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) in ten years, as shows in Equation 13.
Fexponential(t) = e
−MTTF×t
FWeibull(t) = e
−( t
η
)β
FWeibull(t) = FExponential(t)→MTTF =
( t
η
)β
t
(13)
Where t is time, η is characteristic life, β is shape parameter, and
MTTF is Mean Time to Failure. MTTR is obtained by the same
equation. Then we set t to 10 years (87600 hours) and calculate
MTTF and MTTR of exponential distribution. As such, both
Weibull and exponential distributions generate the same number of
failure/repair incidences (disk failure, LSE, disk repair, and scrub-
bing) within 10 years mission time. Fig. 15 shows Markov model
results and the error of Markov model with respect to Monte Carlo
simulation results. The error bar (in red color) and error percentage
(appeared beside each bar) is also included in this figure. As the figure
shows, Markov results have up to 97% error (in NOMDL DF+LSE
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TABLE IX: Comparison of the proposed model results with previous work and field data from enterprise-level storage products of a leading
storage system manufacturer and storage service provider.
NOMDL NOMDU
Field Data 0.00164 15% of total DU
Proposed Model (hep = 0.001) 0.00158 1.61E-08
Proposed Model (hep = 0.0001) 0.00141 9.96E-10
Proposed Model (hep = 0.01) 0.00316 1.58E-07
Proposed Model (hep = 0.1) 0.0166 1.82E-06
Greenan [18] and Elerath [17], [16] approach considering disk failure and LSE with Weibull distribution (hep = 0.0) 0.00140 0
Conventional approach considering disk failure with exponential distribution 0.00145 0
(a) NOMDU
(b) NOMDL-DDF
(c) NOMDL-DF+LSE
Fig. 15: Comparison between Monte Carlo simulation and Markov
model results. The NOMDU and NOMDL obtained from Markov
model is reported for different hep for 1000 RAID5(7 + 1) arrays
of Disk A, Disk B, and Disk C (Table I). The error bar is drawn with
respect to Monte Carlo simulation results. The error percentage also
appears beside each bar. We differentiate NOMDL caused by DDF
and LSE+DF, respectively appeared in sub-figures b and c.
for Disk C), while the lowest error is observed in NOMDU (less than
0.1% for all three disks and 0.05% on average). However, NOMDL
DDF has average error of 37%, 13%, and 6% respectively for disk
A, disk B, and disk C (average of 19% for all three disks). NOMDL
DF+LSE has also an average error of 0.3%, 3%, and 97% respectively
for disk A, disk B, and disk C (average of 33% for all three disks).
Hence, the highest error of NOMDL DF+LSE belongs to disk C,
while the highest error of NOMDL DDF belongs to disk A and the
highest error of NOMDU belongs to disk B.
H. Model Results For Global Erasure Codes
In this section, we examine the dependability of gen-
eral erasure codes presented in Section III-G. In addition to
RAID5 (PMDS(m,n, 1, 0)) and RAID6 (PMDS(m,n, 2, 0)),
here we examine PMDS(m,n, 1, 1), PMDS(m,n, 1, 2), and
PMDS(m,n, 2, 2), by considering the effect of disk failures,
LSEs, and human errors. We choose PMDS(m,n, 1, 1) and
PMDS(m,n, 1, 2) that have a slightly greater ERF than RAID5,
but considerably lower ERF than RAID6. Both PMDS(m,n, 1, 1)
and PMDS(m,n, 1, 2) can cope with one device failure and respec-
tively one and two symbol failures (due to respectively having one
and two Global parities). PMDS(m,n, 2, 2) has a ERF greater than
both RAID5 and RAID6, while it can cope with two device failures
alongside two symbol failures per code-word.
Using the framework described in Section III-E, we conduct Monte
Carlo simulations and check the failure conditions appeared in Ta-
ble VI to recognize ADL, SDL, ADU , and SDU failure cases and
finally calculate NOMDU and NOMDL. In summary, by considering
ADL, SDL, ADU, and SDU statistics, we obtain NOMDU and
NOMDL as shown in Fig. 16. One important observation in the
NOMDU and NOMDL results of different erasure codes is that the
codes with the same number of row parities have almost the same
NOMDL and NOMDU value. We can justify this observation by
the fact that the magnitude of data unavailability and magnitude
of data loss caused by device failures is significantly greater than
stripe failures. In specific, per ADL event, the magnitude of data
loss is 8TB (assuming 1TB disks and array size of 8), versus 128KB
per SDL event (hence, the magnitude of ADL is 62,500,000 times
greater than SDL). This fact results in the superiority of the effect
of ADL and ADU events in the final NOMDU and NOMDL values.
For example, NOMDL of RAID6 and PMDS(2, 2) is very similar
(4.05249887 × 10−5 and 4.0524983 × 10−5, respectively), as both
arrays perform the same in ADU and ADL, but different in SDU and
SDL, due to having the same number of row parities and different
number of global parities. We can also observe that in all erasure
codes, human error increases both NOMDL and NOMDU by almost
one order of magnitude that corroborates our previous observations
on RAID5.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we investigated the effect of incorrect disk re-
placement service on the data unavailability and data loss of disk
subsystem by using Monte Carlo simulations. We also proposed
NOMDU, as the duration of data unavailability multiplied to the
logical amount of unavailable data, normalized to the mission time
and logical capacity of storage system, as a more useful availability
metric for storage systems. By taking the effect of incorrect disk
replacement service into account, it is shown that human errors can
cause the unavailability of storage array by order of magnitude. The
human error can also increase the probability of data loss, specially
when the human error probability is greater than 0.01. It is also shown
that in case the human error probability is high (0.01 and beyond),
the conventional dependability ranking of RAID configurations is
contradicted. Lastly, the model results show that automatic fail-over
can significantly decrease the data unavailability and data loss, caused
by human errors, by orders of magnitude. Such information can be
employed by both designers and system administrators to increase
the system dependability.
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Fig. 16: NOMDU and NOMDL obtained by Monte Carlo simulations
for different configurations of PMDS codes.
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APPENDIX A
DEPENDABILITY ANALYSIS OF GENERAL ERASURE CODES
A. ADL Condition
ADL happens in a very simple condition, when the number of
failed devices (DF ) surpasses r (the number of redundant devices).
r < DF (14)
B. SDL Condition
SDL happens when ADL condition is not satisfied, but there exist
at least one stripe where the number of LSEs surpasses the maximum
correctable LSEs. Stripe v has the following number of LSEs:
n∑
i=1
NUMLSE(i, v) (15)
The maximum correctable LSEs per stripe is the aggregation of LSEs
correctable by global parities and LSEs correctable by row parities.
The number of LSEs correctable by global parity is equal to s
(number of global parities). However, the number of LSEs correctable
by row parity depends on the number of failed devices (DF ) and the
distribution of LSEs in the stripe. Using PMDS(m,n, r, s), in each
stripe we can behave h number of operational devices as failed device
and correct all their LSEs using row parities, where:
h = r −DF (16)
h, is the number of operational devices that are behaved as failed
device and all of their LSEs (regardless of the number of LSEs in
that device) are corrected using row parities. To attain the maximum
possible correction capability, we select h devices that have the
maximum number of LSEs. Hence, the maximum correctable LSEs
using row parities is as follows:
r−DF∑
i=1
NUMLSE(MAX(i, v), v) (17)
Finally, SDL happens when the following condition is satisfied:
(DF ≤ r) ∧ (∃v ∈ V [s+∑r−DF
i=1
NUMLSE(MAX(i, v), v) <
∑n
i=1
NUMLSE(i, v)])
(18)
C. ADU Condition
ADU happens when ADL condition is not satisfied, but the
aggregation of failed devices (DF ) and unavailable devices by human
error (HE) surpasses r:
(DF ≤ r) ∧ (r < DF +HE) (19)
D. SDU Condition
SDU happens when ADU and ADL conditions are not satisfied
and at least one stripe exists where the number of LSEs does not
surpass the maximum correctable LSEs, but its data is unavailable
due to human error. For satisfying SDU condition, at least one human
error is happened and ADU and ADL conditions are unsatisfied:
(0 < HE) ∧ (DF +HE ≤ r) (20)
Moreover, the stripe v has no lost sectors under the following
condition (as discussed in the case of SDL):
n∑
i=1
NUMLSE(i, v)−
r−DF∑
i=1
NUMLSE(MAX(i, v), v) ≤ s (21)
Finally, stripe v has unavailable sectors under the condition that
the number of LSEs in the available devices does not surpass the
maximum LSEs obtainable with the available devices. The number
of LSEs in the available devices is as follows:
n∑
i=1
NUMLSE(i, v)×OP (i) (22)
Maximum LSEs obtainable with available devices is the aggregation
of LSEs obtainable with global parities and LSEs obtainable with
row parities. The number of LSEs obtainable by global parity is
equal to s (the number of global parities). However, the number
of LSEs obtainable by row parities is a function of the number of
failed devices (DF ), number of unavailable devices due to human
error (HE), and the distribution of LSEs in the stripe. Using
PMDS(m,n, r, s), in each stripe we can behave h number of
operational devices as unavailable device and obtain all their LSEs
using row parities (regardless of the number of LSEs in that device),
where:
h = r −DF −HE (23)
To obtain the maximum possible LSEs, we select h operational de-
vices that have the maximum number of LSEs. Hence, the maximum
obtainable LSEs using row parities is as follows:
r−DF−HE∑
i=1
NUMLSE(MAXOP (i, v), v) (24)
And the maximum obtainable LSEs in stripe v is the aggregation of
s and above value. Hence, stripe v has unavailable sectors under the
following condition:
s+
∑r−DF−HE
i=1
NUMLSE(MAXOP (i, v), v) <
∑n
i=1
NUMLSE(i, v)×OP (i)
(25)
All in all, SDU happens when the following condition is satisfied:
(0 < HE) ∧ (DF +HE ≤ r) ∧ (∃v ∈ V [(∑n
i=1
NUMLSE(i, v) ≤ s+
∑r−DF
i=1
NUMLSE(MAX(i, v), v))
∧(s+∑r−DF−HE
i=1
NUMLSE(MAXOP (i, v), v) <
∑n
i=1
NUMLSE(i, v)×OP (i))])
(26)
APPENDIX B
CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF ADL AND SDL INCIDENCES
In Fig. 17 and Fig. 18, we respectively draw the cumu-
lative number of ADL and SDL incidences for RAID5(7 +
1), RAID6(7 + 2), PMDS(m, 8, 1, 1), PMDS(m, 8, 1, 2), and
PMDS(m, 9, 2, 2), respectively denoted as RAID5, RAID6,
PMDS(1, 1), PMDS(1, 2), and PMDS(2, 2) in the charts. To
have a fair comparison, the erasure codes are considered to have
almost equal usable capacity of seven drives (note PMDS codes
have a usable capacity slightly lower than 7, due to the overhead of
Global Parities). The simulation parameters are appeared in Table I,
Table II, and Table III. As the number of ADL incidences depends
on the number of row parity devices, the erasure codes with the
same number of row parities result in the same number of ADL
in each fault injection experiment. Hence, we concatenate the ADL
of RAID5, PMDS(1, 1), and PMDS(1, 2), and also concatenate
ADL of RAID6 and PMDS(2, 2) in Fig. 17.
The first set of results is obtained for 10,000 disk arrays working
for 10 years (87600 hours) considering the real capacity of each disk
(Disk A: 1TB, Disk B: 1TB, Disk C: 288GB), shown in Fig. 17(a)
and Fig. 18(a). As we see in the first set of results, the failure cases
such as multiple LSEs in the same stripe and triple device failure are
so rare. Hence, in practice we see no difference between the results
of RAID6, PMDS(1, 1), PMDS(1, 2), and PMDS(2, 2). To
increase the chance of such failure cases, we decrease the disk sizes
by the factor of 64X (we call it small disk size). Decreasing the
disk size also decreases the simulation time, which makes simulating
larger number of disk arrays practical.
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(a) Normal Disk Size
(b) Small Disk Size
(c) Ultra-Small Disk Size
Fig. 17: Accumulative ADL obtained by Monte Carlo simulations for
different configurations of PMDS codes.
Fig. 17(b) and Fig. 18(b) respectively show the ADL and SDL
for 1,000,000 disk arrays with small size. In the results obtained
by small disk size, we can apparently observe the superiority of
PMDS(1, 2) and PMDS(2, 2) in preventing SDL events (zero
number of SDL in our experiments), due to employing two global
parities that cope with two sector failures per stripe. The results
also show that PMDS(1, 1) outperforms RAID6 in handling sector
failures. For example in the case of disk A, PMDS(1, 1) encounters
79 SDL events versus 193 SDL events observed in RAID6 array.
In the case of array data loss, however, the number of ADL events
is a function of employed row parities (employed redundant disks).
Hence, we can see that RAID6 and PMDS(2, 2) outperform the
rest of codes by almost one order of magnitude, due to employing
two redundant devices rather than one redundant device in RAID5,
PMDS(1, 1), and PMDS(1, 2). For example in the case of disk
A, RAID6 and PMDS(2, 2) encounter 46 ADL events versus 818
ADL events observed in the case of RAID5, PMDS(1, 1), and
PMDS(1, 2).
Finally, the results of Fig. 17(c) and Fig. 18(c) are obtained by
decreasing the disk sizes by the factor of 16384 (we call it ultra-small
disk size) for 100,000,000 disk arrays. In the results obtained by ultra-
small disks, we can further observe the superiority of PMDS(2, 2)
over PMDS(1, 2) in handling sector failures. For example in the
case of disk A, we observed 10 SDL events in PMDS(2, 2) versus
19 SDL events in PMDS(1, 2), as shown in Fig. 18(c).
(a) Normal Disk Size
(b) Small Disk Size
(c) Ultra-Small Disk Size
Fig. 18: Accumulative SDL obtained by Monte Carlo simulations for
different configurations of PMDS codes.
